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This paper begins with Hannah Arendt’s claim that thinking itself is dangerous (1971, 176), and ends 
with an encounter with Dance Curves: On the Dances of Palucca (1926), Wassily Kandinsky’s 
abstraction of a series of postures of German Expressionist choreographer Gret Palucca, from 
embodiment to photograph to line drawing. In my encounter with Dance Curves, I find a model of 
nonconforming criticism, where the relation between my critical engagement with Kandinsky’s 
work, its ties to the photographs of Palucca, and their dialogue between body, movement, writing 
and drawing is made visible through an exposed thinking in process. Nonconforming criticsm is a 
process of deliberately mishandled translation, in this instance, where I intervene in an already 
shifting configuration of ideas. This model of nonconforming criticism unfolds through slippages 
of attention that move beside performance, folding outwards to the political nexus of its nowness. 
To Arendt, thinking is interruptive, but it also leaves you dazzled, ‘feeling unsure of what seemed 
to you beyond doubt’ (1971, 175).  What does this grip of ambiguity offer to thinking in the context 
of criticism, when it exposes itself through peripherals: shifts of attention, adjacent events, 
fragmented translations? Might this dazzlement be hopeful, an interruption into troubled times 
that makes way for a nonconforming criticism? What are the implications of nonconforming 
criticism as a thinking beside performance, toying with the dangerousness of the fragmented, the 
exposed or the vulnerable?  As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick proposes, ‘beside’ offers ‘some useful 
resistance to the ease with which beneath and beyond turn from spatial descriptors into implicit 
narratives’ (2003, 8). For Sedgwick, beside resists dualistic thinking, offering a spaciousness of 
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relation, or, as I see it here, a productive ambiguity of relation between performance and criticism. 
I consider the textures of nonconforming criticism, understood here as a frame that renders legible 
forms of thinking in process, (beside performance,) that reject the category of criticism either 
implicitly or explicitly, or dismiss its utility. Instead of engaging with criticism’s temporal relations 
to performance, I am interested in its phenomenology. Implicit in this exploration is an encounter 
with the politics of Arendt’s work on thinking and appearance tethered to the now.  
In this entwinement of unfinished configurations of meanings, gripped by experience and 
distracted by the plural futurities of now (the political moment), being dazzled might be a form of 
resistance to what Bojana Kunst calls ‘the ready-made possibilities of discourse’, that is, the ‘pre-
established models of criticality and reflexivity’ to which art and artistic subjectivity often partake 
(2015, 13). Kunst’s work considers the relation between subjectivity, neoliberalism and modes of 
work, making a case for a paradoxical relation: between work as an activity and process that 
pertains to the common, and one that concerns appearance precisely because of its potential 
coercion. I use work here to speak of the activity of criticism, as well as the process of undertaking 
that activity and its making visible. Similarly, criticism is constituted here in reference to what 
Roland Barthes foregrounds as an activity, rather than a body of judgments ([1966] 1987, 12), and 
Jennifer Doyle explores as residing in an affective density made possible by its eventness, that is, 
criticism as a ‘deeper awareness of the space around artworks and expanding our sense of what it 
means to be present to art’ (2013, 14). Nonconforming criticism is a lens through which to examine 
thinking in process that disturbs coercion through a queering of its utility.   
My concern is with processes of recognition, rather than criticism as an object of study. Recognition 
is tied to assumptions of what constitutes an inherent good, which implicate this critical act in a 
particular politics. Recent Indigenous political scholarship, most notably the work of Glen 
Coulthard and Audra Simpson, points to the problematic nature of recognition when it claims 
transcendence from forms of structured dispossession without acknowledging its reliance on 
mutuality. Simpson argues that political recognition often results in a reiteration of colonial 
structures precisely because of its staging of relations of inclusion (2014, 17), whilst Coulthard 
proposes self-recognition as a vision of decolonisation that rejects dependency (2014, 42). 
Relations of power become reconfigured when recognition occurs by means of an alternative 
politics. It is here where beside, as Sedgwick argues, offers a productive spatial irreducibility that 
sets a different ecology of relations between thinking, affect, criticism and performance. The 
interruptiveness of thinking as it unfolds in encounters with attention constitutes a poetics of 
appearance that is vulnerable, searching for dissonance, rather than homogeneity.  
Arendtian scholars disagree over the extent to which her later work on judgment and thinking 
constitutes a break with, or a continuation of, her investigation into politics (Beiner 1997, Disch 
1994, Young 1997, Taylor 2002), yet share an articulation of Arendt’s work as marked by a poetics 
of withdrawal and appearance. Here, I consider the inter-relation of Arendt’s political examination 
of appearance and thinking through the prism of a model of nonconforming criticism that 
destabilises thinking as interruptive and withdrawn, and appearance as spectatorial and collective. 
Arendt argues that ‘feelings, passions and emotions’ which ‘can no more become part and parcel 
 27 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5 (1) (2019) 
of the world of appearances than our inner organs’ (1971, 31). At the same time, experience, 
emotion and reflection are inter-related: ‘every show of anger, as distinct from the anger I feel, 
already contains a reflection on it’ (1971, 31). This incomplete line of inquiry in Arendt’s work 
between thinking and appearance opens up an encounter with entanglements rather than 
distinctions. Nonconforming criticism implicates emotions and passions with thinking and 
experience; in doing so, it destabilises discursive structures that conceal difference.   
Thinking and action: tethers of presence  
In The Human Condition, Arendt articulates the inter-relatedness of action, speech and 
togetherness: ‘without the accompaniment of speech’, she proposes, action would ‘lose its subject, 
as it were’ ([1958] 1998, 178). In Arendt’s conception of the political, language is what enables an 
articulation of action: to speak is a form of action, when it takes place in a web of relations. What 
‘appears in the outside world’, Arendt argues, is only what we make of somatic experience ‘through 
the operation of thought’ (1971, 32). Thinking’s special predicaments, Arendt states in The Life of 
the Mind, ‘may be ascribed to the radicalism of its withdrawal from the world’ (1971, 22). In this 
radicalism, there is also already a process of translation that is tied to an idea of the commons. It 
is also a relating of body, matter and thinking.  Arendt’s life-long project of asking ‘what we are 
doing’ when we are thinking ([1958] 1998, 5) marks her as a writer deeply committed to the 
entanglement of thinking and politics, and concerned with what constitutes the matter of thinking.  
Whilst Arendt’s position presupposes thinking as an interruptive and private activity, this is 
grounded in her relation to modernity as a moment of crisis, in which the realm of freedom 
becomes subsumed to the ‘maintenance of life’ (1998, 40). The danger, Arendt warns, is that ‘the 
modern age […]  may end in the […] most sterile passivity’ (1998, 322). This is not surprising for 
Arendt, the reluctant philosopher, who displayed a commitment to thinking the political whilst 
sceptical of Western philosophy’s resistance to the political freedom of action (Arendt in Hayden 
2014, 14).  
It is for this reason that Arendt foregrounds a poetics of appearance, in which morality is posited 
as the problem of distinguishing between good and evil, contextualised in relation to thinking on 
the nature of publicness, judgement and thought.  Mental activities, which are to Arendt non-
appearing, ‘occur in a world of appearances and a being that partakes of these appearances 
through its receptive sense organs as well as through its own ability and urge to appear to others’ 
([1958] 1998, 75). In Arendt, I find thought at the edge of what appears, and what wants to make 
itself appear. The processes of visibility and withdrawal mark the articulation of thought. Arendt 
contemplates the intertwined nature of thinking, will, and judgement. In her opening to the first 
volume of The Life of the Mind, dedicated to the activity of thinking, Arendt includes a quote from 
Plato that is telling of the theatricality of thought in her own conception: 
Every one of us is like a man who sees 
things in a dream and thinks that he 
knows them perfectly and then wakes 
up to find that he knows nothing. (Plato in Arendt 1971, xvii) 
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The quote is from Plato’s Statesman, the Socratic dialogue about the relationship between power 
and knowledge. On the one side, the argument presents the statesman as ruler by virtue of his 
expert knowledge, and on the other, the statesman merely presents an appearance of that 
knowledge, without actually possessing it.  This distinction between the appearance of knowledge, 
and thinking as a process distinct to that of obtaining knowledge, is important in Arendt’s work. 
Prompted by her earlier work in The Human Condition, Arendt argues for a relation between 
thinking and action cautious to appearances of knowledge, but committed to examining what 
separates being in the common world from being private. To Arendt, this fuels a key question: 
‘where are we, when we are thinking?’ (1971, 7). I am interested in the dimension of thinking in 
Arendt’s work not as a matter of privacy, but as one that is necessarily tethered to plurality.  
In Arendt, plurality of thought is interconnected with political plurality. This is best expressed in the 
interlinking of the terms vita activa, the life of action, tied to political plurality, and vita contemplativa, 
that of contemplation, tied to thinking, which for Arendt draw meaning for one another (1998, 17). 
To Arendt, action itself is connected to plurality as a human condition, and all thought arises out 
of experience: ‘no experience yields any meaning or even coherence without undergoing the 
operations of imagining and thinking’ (1971, 87). Plurality, to Arendt, is a means of being with 
‘difference’ (1971, 184) that grounds the activity of thinking. At the same time, Arendt’s ideal thinker 
is someone who ‘knows only that he knows not’ (1971, 173). An inquiry into thinking is, for Arendt, 
a ‘means to bring out of hiding’ (1971, 66). But what might be implicated in a queering of these sets 
of relations in Arendtian work, in favour of a porosity that disavows public and private binaries, 
refocusing on collectivity and dazzlement?   
In Affective Economies, Sara Ahmed challenges the assumption that ‘emotions are a private matter’ 
in order to argue for their centrality in ‘the surfacing of individuals and collective bodies’ through 
their circulation (2004, 117). To Ahmed, emotions are not within, but they ‘create the very effect of 
the surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds’ (ibid.). Similarly, Doyle, in her examination of the 
ethics of radical refusal, points to the ways in which emotions question ‘who is being disposed of 
what, who is unravelled, how and why’ (2013, xiv). And in Touching Feeling, Sedgwick inquires into 
the relation of phenomenology and affect, accounting for the intimate association between touch 
and affect (2003, 19), foregrounding the matter of thinking. Touching and feeling are ways of 
attending to experience; it is precisely in the vulnerable intimacy of presence that thinking emerges 
already in process, already in commons. Thinking holds a performative dimension, that already 
affects. If emotions are, as Ahmed reminds us, never within, but always in relation, so too does 
thinking make evident boundaries of bodies, or, as Arendt states (in the line quoted above), a 
bringing out of hiding.  
Sedgwick’s commitment to language itself as ‘productive of reality’ (2003, 5) is significant here, 
displacing JL Austin’s performative ‘from its localised dwelling’ to ‘a property of language’ (2003, 6).  
Interestingly, Sedgwick’s work in Touching Feeling is precisely oriented around the performativity of 
the non-linguistic, or rather, ‘involved with this unsettling aberrance between performativity and 
theatricality’ (2003, 7). For Sedgwick, the entanglement between touching and feeling, texture and 
affect, is constituted not by ‘delicacy of scale’, but by their being ‘irreducibly phenomenological’ 
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(2003, 21). This materiality is precisely what I want to bring to Arendt’s conception of thinking: 
interruption is not what occludes thinking from appearing; rather, it is the precondition for its 
appearance, particularly in slips of language, in the affective economies and material embodiments 
of language.  
There is, nevertheless, a tension implicit in Arendt’s relating of social and political, public and 
private. Despite her philosophical education shaped by phenomenology and existentialism, as 
much as it was by migration and conversation, Arendt was a reluctant philosopher. This is most 
visible in the shifting tonalities of her work from the human condition to the activities of the mind. 
Committed to collective action, she was equally interested in what emerges in the public realm of 
appearances as she was in the withdrawal necessary for thinking to occur. Feminist engagements 
with Arendt’s work (Benhabib 1993, Dietz 1991, Honig 1995, Pitkin 1998) have foregrounded the 
problematic use of the concepts of the social and the private in relation to political agency, whilst 
at the same time accounting for the potentials of collectivity, plurality, and difference in the work 
by means of a rejection of conformism, a searching for the agency of thought.  
Contemporary readings of Arendt foreground the ways in which affect and resistance are an 
important part of her political thinking. For example, Kimberly Maslin proposes that what marks 
Arendt as such an intriguing figure is her commitment to reinforcing ‘the impossibility of divorcing 
political form from the ontological aspects of human existence’ (2012, 586). This marks her as a 
deeply political thinker whose concerns with activities of the mind are inherently connected to her 
interest in plurality and the public realm.  More explicitly, Deborah Nelson explores the 
entanglement between affect and thought in Arendtian work, examining how thinking and 
suffering were intertwined for her, inherently connected to an acknowledgement of plurality and 
distress: the person who stands between the ‘twin poles of totalitarian idealism—the solipsism of 
thoughtlessness and the boundarylessness of revolutionary sympathy—must tolerate, even 
embrace […] distress’ (2017, 71).  This relationship emerges for example, in her essay Truth and 
Politics. Here Arendt speaks of modes of being alone—the ‘solitude of the philosopher’, the 
isolation of the scientist and the artist’—as having in common a lack of political commitment ‘as 
long as one of them lasts’ (1968, 255). However, when such modes of being are adopted as modes 
of life, they enter ‘in conflict with the demands of the political’ (255). This is, according to Arendt, of 
political relevance: ‘conceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change,’ Arendt tell us, but its 
metaphorical value is as ‘the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us’ (259). 
Arendt’s relating of modes of being to public and private life is connected to her interest in 
articulating the process that connects thinking and action. The mind’s ability is to make ‘present 
what is actually absent’ (1968, 76). This coming into appearance is connected to what Arendt sees 
as the space of appearance in The Human Condition, as that which ‘predates and precedes all formal 
constitution of the public realm’ ([1958] 1998, 199), that is, political organisation itself. This is in 
dialogue with the dual conception of the public as standing in both for ‘being seen and heard by 
everybody’ (50) and ‘the world itself, in so far as it is common to us all’ (52). This dimension of 
witnessing anticipates our contemporary understanding of performativity as constitutive and 
affective; if thinking holds a performative dimension, then what relation does this hold with 
appearance? 
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Fundamental to Arendt’s philosophy of appearance is the position that ‘nothing and nobody exists 
in this world whose very being does not predispose a spectator’ (1971, 19). The realm of 
appearance is constituted through spectated actions. It is, in other words, always witnessed. This 
conception, however, needn’t imply a separation that deactivates the witness from participating. 
As Arendt argues, appearance is 'something that is being seen and heard by others as well as 
ourselves' ([1958] 1998, 50). Our feeling for reality and, as such, our relationship to reality is 
governed by appearance, as that which provides a realm in which to see ‘what is worthy of being 
seen or heard’ ([1958] 1998, 51). Arendt therefore delineates a notion of appearance that is a 
fundamental characteristic of the public realm, itself a necessity of collective political engagement, 
but also establishes a relation between thinking and doing, collective bodies and sense-making 
processes, tied to the performative.  
In Performativity and Performance, Sedgwick and Andrew Parker expand performativity to account 
for the act of witnessing, as opposed to an inherent citationality present in language. ‘It’s the 
aptitude of the explicit performative,’ they conclude, ‘for mobilizing and epitomizing such 
transformative effects on interlocutory space that makes it almost irresistible […] to associate it 
with theatrical performance’ (1993, 13). This tether to action makes possible a relation between 
‘text and context’ (15). It also, however, makes possible an understanding of the potential of 
thinking and its ties with action, particularly when its processes appear in and through language. 
Parker and Sedgwick’s revisiting of performativity examines the constant shift between text and 
context, between saying as doing, and doing as saying. 
Arendt’s own choreographic move between the constitution of the public body and the 
interruptiveness of thinking enmeshes the affective into the political. Cecilia Sjöholm touches 
explicitly on Arendt as a thinker whose philosophical engagements with appearance are defined 
by ‘what it means to act and think in a world that is defined through differentiation’, as appearances 
can only be conceived ‘in terms of variety, multiplicity and heterogeneity’ (2015, 13).  This 
engagement with variety and aesthetics is fundamental to Arendt’s conception of appearance. In 
her interview with Günter Gaus, prompted by a question regarding her philosophical work, Arendt 
states that her profession, ‘if one can even speak of it at all, is political theory’ ([1964] 2013, 22). 
This position discloses Arendt’s commitment to differentiating political thinking as something that 
triggers collective action, creating new spheres of freedom. For Arendt, language remains; but 
language also matters, and this mattering holds multiple implications. Might this ‘matter’ be 
surfaced, to return to Ahmed, through the circulation of affects? In what ways might criticism act 
as a productive frame through which such negotiations might take place between thinking and 
matter, publicness, and collectivity, shifting modalities of thinking about criticism from the 
transactional to the phenomenological? 
‘Letting something else through’: productive tensions  
Criticism constitutes, engages in, and often reproduces networks of power. These networks of 
power operate infrastructurally, by connecting the (performance) work, frames, and structures of 
its presentation, the social arrangements it invites or constitutes, and economic and cultural 
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politics that shape these. At play are both structural and cultural operations of power. I am 
interested in what I call nonconforming criticism as a reaction to these operations of power, their 
occlusions, and the predominant colonial structures that have shaped dominant critical practices 
in the cultural ecology. I understand nonconforming criticism not as an emergent phenomenon; 
instead, I see it as a frame that enables differentiation between structures that occlude alternative 
forms of criticism, and those that continue to reshape and confront them. To this end, 
nonconforming criticism explicitly rejects its usefulness to performance, instead thinking beside it. 
In my encounter with Arendt’s examination of thinking through affect, I see emergent connective 
tissues of criticism: relation and poetics. These signal the tense relationship criticism has to 
questions of deliberation and representation, shaped by the dominance of rationalist traditions 
that have dominated performance criticism since the Enlightenment, tethered to notions of 
authority.  
Feminist historians of the eighteenth century, such as Jean Elshtain (1981), Joan Landes (1988), 
Mary P. Ryan (1998), Dena Goodman (1992), Amanda Vickery (1998), and Nancy Fraser (1990, 2007), 
have argued that the formation of political and public rationality conceals more complex relations 
between different publics and gendered spheres of debate. Elshtain proposes that the problem 
was a politics of recognition that constituted a public/private binary: the politicisation of the public 
is part of an ‘elaborate defence against the tug of the private, against the lure of the familial, against 
evocations of female power’ (1981, 15–16). Goodman collapses this division to examine how 
women occupied spheres in which different forms of critique developed, ‘constituted by salons, 
Masonic lodges, academies and the press’ (1992, 4). Goodman argues that ‘the very instability of 
conceptions of public and private spheres […] helped to create volatile and shifting ground upon 
which both criticism and revolution were constructed’ (1992, 2). Such accounts point to the ways 
in which criticism and its relation to gendered notions of rationality ‘serve as a mask for domination’ 
(Fraser 1998, 64), showing how ‘political economy enforces structurally what culture accomplishes 
informally’ (1998, 65). Fraser proposes that ‘the meaning and boundaries of publicity depend at 
every point on who has the power to draw the line between public and private’ (2007, 314). This 
inter-dependence of criticism, political power, and publicity makes evident the ways in which 
mastery is constituted around the conflation of authority with authorship, publicness with 
exclusion.  
Similarly, in his examination of the intellectual politics of the Romantic period in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, historian Alex Benchimol argues that ‘two significant traditions of 
intellectual practice: one popular and radical, the other bourgeois and liberal’ (2010, 11) 
characterised the emergence of early forms of criticism. This led to the development of a contested 
‘cultural modernity’ (ibid.) that laid the groundwork for traditions of criticism situated within, and 
on the margins of, the press—from newspapers to periodicals, pamphlets, and salons.  Benchimol 
refers to this ongoing cultural conflict as a process of differentiation and struggle ‘over control of 
the very basis of intellectual conflict: the idea of an organised public’ (2010, 4), at a time when new 
modes of ‘intellectual sociability emerged’ (2010, 5). Benchimol’s analysis is an important reminder 
of the tie between politics and value in criticism and, notably, reviewing practices. Across 
scholarship of the eighteenth century, criticism’s relation to authority is tied to cultural conflicts 
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that shaped it, and connected to a tension between artistic and economic value, publicness and 
rationality—colonial, gendered structures that fashioned particular sensibilities tied to whiteness, 
power, and visibility.  
This relation to authority, authorship, and rationality is also made evident across contemporary 
scholarship on criticism (Butt 2005, Lijster and Gielen in Lijster et al. 2005, Elkins and Newman 
2008, Felski 2015). For example, in her work Critique and Postcritique, Rita Felski reminds us of how 
the turn to affect in literary critique challenges its rationalism and ‘its frequent neglect of emotion, 
mood and disposition’ (2015, 11). Similarly, Felski mentions postcolonial and decolonial studies on 
criticism that make evident its ‘indebtedness to linguistic models’ and its privileging of 
interpretation at the omission of ‘vectors of experience that resist or exceed such an explanatory 
frame’ (2015, 14). Felski’s engagement moves beyond a politics of positionality, revealing the 
potential of alternative modes of resistance and critical cultures that, to draw on Talal Asad’s words, 
account for ‘competing conceptions of meaning’ (Asad in Felski 2015, 14). Critique is connected not 
only to modernity’s colonial logic, but also to an Enlightenment conception of politics and 
rationality, in which the public voice is already embedded in a politics of exclusion. This tradition 
of criticism becomes an institution, shaping public discursive spaces rather than participating in 
them. There is a historically grounded relation between criticism, publics, and deliberative spaces, 
tied to the constitution of the nation-state and patriarchal notions of critique.  
Political theorist Jodi Dean speaks explicitly to the contemporary dimensions of criticism’s relation 
to the democratic, examining the ties between political critique, debate, and neoliberalism. I note 
in her study the foregrounding of how compliance, instrumentalisation, and occlusion dominate 
contemporary criticism, with severe implications for its potential for radicality. Dean’s notion of 
communicative capitalism challenges ‘the commonplace idea that the market, today, is the site of 
democratic aspirations’ and, she adds, ‘the mechanisms by which the will of the demos manifests’ 
(2005, 55). This presupposes a relation between criticism and political rationality rooted in the 
eighteenth century, but whose resistance might lie in dwelling in and beyond language and 
thinking’s vulnerabilities to dominance, as well as criticism’s relation to mastery.  
As an ideology and practice of contemporary government, neoliberalism has global reach as well 
as local specificity, and has been most widely examined (Brown 2015, Harvie 2005, Saad-Filho and 
Johnston 2005) as rooted in the stimulation of competition with limited state regulation. 
Neoliberalism is a political rationality that alters discourses on value, and it is here we identify the 
co-option of some forms of criticism in the interests of monetisation. This ecology places pressure 
on cultural work’s productivity at an economic and civic level, whilst also appropriating its affective 
structures to an increasingly growing and cross-profession private sector. It enmeshes subjectivity 
and collective work in difficult tensions between public and private, political and personal. In order 
to make visible how affective relations unravel political questions of meaning, presence, and 
commons, I think we need to account for the bodied experience of criticism, and foster alternative 
modes for its decolonisation. I see nonconforming criticism as a way of making appear that which 
refutes categorisation as criticism, accounting for the bodied experience of thinking beside 
performance—a different form of vulnerability, a thinking beside.  
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In Unthinking Mastery, Julieta Singh’s examination of the relation of mastery to power and forms of 
violence, the author cites Hélène Cixous’ search for ‘letting something else through’. To Singh, this 
is a becoming differently by means of vulnerability—that is, an awareness of relations of 
dependency (2018, 23). Singh’s work connects mastery to the political realm, situating it beyond 
the realm of political governance by means of a border. To Singh, mastery involves ‘the 
subordination of what is on one side of a border to the power of what is on the other’ (13). Singh 
foregrounds the importance of vital dependency as a means to find new ‘ethico-political 
possibilities’ (24), arguing that mastery emerges as ‘splitting of the object that is mastered from 
itself’ (10). I see criticism as distinctly implicated in mastery as a border of power. In this 
entanglement, I note a relation between mastery and binaries that have shaped dominant 
conceptions of criticism, such as rationality and publicness. I note Singh’s work as paying attention 
to materiality and the ways in which it ‘affects discourse’ (21): a reminder of the material relations 
that exceed language.  
This entanglement between language, affect, and rationality is related to questions of 
public/private, social/political at the heart of some of Arendt’s work. As I have argued here and 
elsewhere (Damian Martin 2015), Arendt enmeshes the affective into the political in her 
examination of thinking and appearance. I therefore understand nonconforming criticism 
precisely as a refusal of legibility, and in this way as an interplay between materiality and affect, 
thinking and its appearance. Criticism’s relations of power (that they often occlude) also seek to 
govern a performance’s meaning or value as a forceful, violent act—what Susan Sontag referred 
to as the excavation of interpretation ([1964] 2009).   
Susan Sontag’s argument in Against Interpretation is based on the proposition that art is a process 
of appearance and that criticism, in its relationship to it, can obscure that becoming visible as much 
as it can contribute to its coming into being. This is most evident in the quote by artist Willem De 
Kooning that starts her essay, which speaks of content as ‘an encounter like a flash’ (quoted in 
Sontag [1964] 2009, 9). The ‘flash’ which De Kooning speaks of is graspable but incomplete, by 
nature temporary and fragmented. Sontag is a key modernist thinker in a lineage of critics 
interested in an open dialogue between art and criticism, calling for a type of criticism that enables 
‘experiencing the luminousness of the thing in itself’ ([1964] 2009, 10). Sontag proposes a criticism 
that foregrounds the work of art through thinking, reorienting interpretation away from excavation 
of meaning, and towards presence.  Sontag shapes criticism as tethering thinking and appearance. 
Criticism is conceived as a critical document of a time-bound encounter with performance. This is 
not dissimilar to subsequent ontological explorations of performance documentation and modes 
of relating performance, writing, embodiment, and duration (e.g. Phelan 1993, Schneider 2011).  
What marks both the work of Sontag and that of Arendt is a shared interest in art’s appearance. 
For Sontag, this takes the form of a rejection of explication as emphasised by her title, ‘Against 
Interpretation’, whereas for Arendt, it is an investment in art’s ‘capacity for thought’ ([1958] 1998, 
168). Arendt’s own exploration of art distils its capacity for traces, though she severs art from 
political practice per se: ‘the men of speech and action […] need the artist, the poet and the 
historian […] because without them the only product of their activity […] would not survive a 
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moment’ ([1958] 1998, 173). I am interested in how Arendt attributes thinking processes to the 
work of art itself, as well as the permanence of its trace. I see this attribution as marking a shared 
concern with Sontag’s rejection of the excavation of meaning.  Both search for ways of capturing 
the multiple threads of meaning (and its traces) left by the work of art. Sontag’s claim of 
interpretation as liberating a work of art when resisting explanation offers us a mode of locating a 
contemporary politics to the event of criticism. Arendt draws a link between appearance as a 
means of political engagement and recognition, and the notion of plurality. In this way, Sontag’s 
resistance to interpretation is phenomenological. Returning to questions of temporality, thinking, 
and affect, I see a politics of nonconforming criticism that rests on a relation of mutuality between 
performance and criticism—what Singh proposes as ‘being differently’, and what I suggest as 
thinking beside performance. This implicates a different relation to the work of art, in which 
criticism is not subordinated, but adjacent to it.  
Sontag was a voracious diarist, and amidst the volumes of fragmented reflections she produced 
between 1964 and 1980, published under the title As Consciousness Is Harnessed to Flesh: Journals 
and Notebooks, I find a proposition worth dwelling on: that writing is a series of transformations. 
‘The function of writing is to explode one’s subject—transform it into something else,’ she proposes 
(11/5/76). I am interested in what is held in tension within this statement: the explosion of the 
subject of writing in turn requires a transformation on behalf of the subject who is writing. What 
might be made visible in further considering the politics of this self-reflective encounter in a wider 
phenomenology of criticism? What if we shift Sontag’s argument about appearance away from 
luminousness, that is, criticism as making a work itself appear, to a different relation: beside 
Thinking beside performance, rather than away or towards, creates potential for a new critical 
phenomenology. If thinking itself is performative, beside performance reveals a discursive relation 
not only between subject and performance work, but also between processes of thinking and their 
affective matter.  
The hopeful possibility of nonconforming criticism as a frame for being beside performance lies in 
thinking’s appearance, like de Kooning’s flash in Sontag’s essay: emergent in language’s affective 
economies, the noise of parallel encounters, inattention to performance’s phenomenology for a 
dwelling in the present that is only possible, because of its exposure of thinking: a mishandled 
disclosure of sorts. I recall Peggy Phelan’s assertion in The Ends of Performance: ‘the challenge for 
us is to love the thing we’ve lost without assimilating it so thoroughly that it becomes us rather 
than remaining itself’ (1998, 11). I propose that nonconforming criticism operates through its own 
formative, phenomenological processes of appearance. It also stages a process of appearance of 
meaning that has a different mode of relation to the modernist logic of interpretation: one that 
exposes thinking, and makes visible autonomous meaning-making processes made to appear 
within its fabric.  
I see the distinctness of nonconforming criticism as residing in thinking’s performative witnessing. 
Arendt proposes that thinking is a mode of being in public: disclosure without closure. Thinking is 
a site of politicisation. Therefore, we might see how thinking acts as a connective tissue with the 
encounter with performance and its time. What is revealed by the peripheral fragments—
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memories, collisions of events both within and outside performance, shifts in attention, disclosures 
of subjectivity—when these are unresolved, yet understood as the fabric of criticism itself? 
In attending to these slippages of attention and engagements often illegible as criticism, I search 
for thinking that is processual, fragmented, and multiple, but also an action—perhaps, to borrow 
from Arendt herself, thinking that is dangerous. In tension with Arendt’s conviction that thinking is 
necessarily an act of withdrawal, I ask, what value might be found in thinking that is exposed? 
Similarly, what porousness might exist between thinking and affect, criticism and performance? 
How might we develop new ways of paying attention to thinking in its multiple human and non-
human interactions, a letting of something else through?  
In lieu of an ending, an opening: troubled encounters 
In lieu of an ending, I ask if a phenomenological engagement with nonconforming criticism might 
bring forth potential openings that tend to our encounter with the present; how thinking beside 
performance might refuse criticism’s utility and coercion. In my dwelling with Arendt, I sought a 
resistant poetics rooted in thinking, politics, affect, and their entanglement. In line with Kunst’s 
elaboration of work as a dual performance, I am interested in how thinking emerges in 
nonconforming criticism, its dissonant appearance and politics of use.  This relation of beside 
performance is not distinct to performance criticism. In her work Site-Writing: The Architecture of Art 
Criticism, Jane Rendell proposes that criticism is tied to spatial sites of engagement ‘which are 
material, emotional, political and conceptual’ (2010, 1), which can be examined as distinct modes 
of critical writing. Rendell foregrounds a spatial politics of criticism that favours multiple modes of 
attention which account for how sites interlock with artwork. Art writer and theorist Mieke Bal also 
speaks of her encounter with an artwork in similar terms. In Louise Bourgeois’ Spider: The 
Architecture of Art Writing, Bal engages in procedural thinking that follows the outlines contained in 
a number of works by the artist Louise Bourgeois. Bal deploys narrative as a way of making 
architecture mean within the artwork. Such an encounter is relevant here for the ways in which it 
is constituted by and through the text, reflecting on the spectatorial implications of two 
simultaneous events: that of writing, and that of the encounter with the work. This spatial 
politicisations of criticism’s encounter with performance work share an interest in foregrounding 
the poetics of criticism’s phenomenology, and resistant relations to its use.  
I am interested in nonconforming criticism as a constitutive of a poetics both hopeful and troubled.  
Speaking of trouble, Donna Haraway aligns it as much with a contemporary diagnosis as with an 
action: ‘We […] live in disturbing times, mixed-up times, troubling and turbid times,’ she proposes. 
‘Our task is to make trouble, to stir up potent responses to devastating events, as well as to settle 
troubled waters and rebuild quiet places’ (2016, 1). Troubled, then, is a multiple state of 
destabilisation and hope. In this phenomenological poetics, nonconforming criticism is constitutive 
of thinking that is tethered to affect, whilst also accounts for the politics of witnessing. In other 
words, criticism is a matter of thinking in process. I turn to four analytical drawings that Wassily 
Kandinsky developed for the essay Dance Curves: On the Dances of Palucca (1926) as a mode of 
thinking beside, as an emergent process within the multiple threads of the work, and as one 
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shaping an encounter with that work, now. I am less concerned here with the work itself, but how 
its extensions and attentions disturb modes of recognition of criticism, both as engagement and 
as form.   
Kandinsky’s Dance Curves concerns itself with four photographs by Charlotte Rudolph that depict 
Gret Palucca in four distinct poses—bent knees and lifted arms, head titled up, body suspended 
on one leg, arm reaching out. Kandinsky’s drawings are presented beside the photographs of 
Palucca, delineated by sharp lines extending in multiple directions, unfinished curves that wrap 
into each other. This relation to bodily abstraction is not devoid of the modernist logic that seeks 
to displace affect, but it is also, I propose, distinctly affective, fragmentary, and incomplete. 
Nonconforming criticism appears here through a dissonant poetics tied to, but also in conflict with, 
the abstraction of the Bauhaus modernism, performing line as movement, movement as 
interruption, and interruption as appearance. There is an anthropocentrism residing in this 
abstraction, implicated with modernism’s problematic logics of capture, yet open to an ecology 
where mastery might equally be troubled, perhaps more so because it marks itself so visibly into 
the relations of beside presented by the work. If mastery is constituted around authority and 
authorship, what relations of disavowal might be possible? What loosening lies beyond a slip of 
attention, and away from the critical fictions contained within this dialogue, in shifting relation 
between source and object, at the borders of language?   
Image 1: Wassily Kandinsky, Dance Curves: On the Dances of Gret Palucca (1926) 
Berlin, Bauhaus-Archiv. 
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It is not that Dance Curves is itself nonconforming; it is the processes of my encounter with it and 
its multiple threads of meaning, in which I follow this mishandled translation, from a body, to a 
photograph, to a drawing, to an encounter. I am not interested in this translation as a problem of 
regimes of encounter, but as a sustaining of concurrent, intersecting and divergent expressions 
which my own witnessing configures. The difficulty in delineating what precisely is nonconforming 
about this encounter, is also precisely what makes this criticism nonconforming. It is, to return to 
Arendt, a dazzlement, in which the materiality of the works sustained within and adjacent to Dance 
Curves takes shape, and in which embodiment opens up as an avenue for adjacent meaning. In this 
affective ecology, thinking is interruptive and dazzling.  
By way of their encounter as analytical drawings, these images did not render a body to a 
document, or movement to stillness, but quite the contrary—despite their relation to the source, 
they lost utility. This accidental displacement frees them from the conventions of early modernist 
abstraction, enables a different choreographic taxonomy to take shape by way of relation: arching 
lines, sharp lines, intersecting lines, tandem lines, suspended lines: politicised lines. My encounter 
pays attention precisely to the gap between the drawings and the body, where the photographer’s 
presence (the third author) also makes itself visible—a document of a thought process, a 
movement with attention: a performance of authorial relation, entangled with the 
contemporaneity of my moment of encounter. This tending to the slippage between Kandinsky, 
Rudolph, and Palucca does not discount their historical entanglements, yet follows the threads of 
thinking as it is made manifest, or made to appear: precisely because of its precarious 
fragmentation.  
In his Point and Line to Plane, Kandinsky expounds on curves in relation to dance as tethered to 
points, ‘brief states of immobility’ that suspend both active and passive point formation (1926, 42). 
Hinged in this positionality, Dance Curves takes shape, to me, precisely in the gaps, the in-between 
of line and body. Accounts of Dance Curves tend to omit Rudolph’s authorial presence, marking a 
distinct relation between drawing and movement, Kandinsky and Palucca. However, Rudolph’s 
photographic authorship complicates the temporal relation and authorial autonomy of the work 
itself, as well as the borders of the work. In that way, I see my own encounter as searching for the 
ambiguity and fiction of the initial proposal of the drawings beside Palucca’s poses. This slip of my 
gaze is a search for something beyond the ‘hegemonic human of modernity’ (2018, 101), even when 
its authorial commitment relied precisely on an attempt to bind a moving subject.  
In this abstraction, another politics is revealed. In examinations of Kandinsky’s essay, Susan Laikin 
Funkenstein foregrounds the ways in which the drawings, presented in relation to the four 
photographs of Palucca, foreground fluidity between dance and visual art, rather than stern 
distinctions that shaped modernist art history.  In Funkenstein’s words, ‘seeming antitheses in 
physical culture and women’s culture’ reveal a contestation of binaries of ‘high art/popular culture, 
masculine/feminine, and mind/body’ (2007, 390). Funkenstein provides a reminder that 
abstraction is not neutral, but ‘infused with complex debates about […] gender identity’ (391), with 
which Kandinsky and Palucca’s compositional dialogue engages. As Cornelia Butler further argues, 
Kandinsky’s conception of the line itself as ‘the imprint of energy—the visible trace of the invisible’ 
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(2010, 154) is influential to Rudolf Laban’s own conception of the gesture as ‘trace form’ (155), for 
example. This critical relation within dance and modernism reveals the porousness of 
compositional borders as well as unmasks a more diverse relation to gender, abstraction, and body 
politics—albeit further woven into an already imbalanced power relation shaped by a desire to 
outline, where body becomes document, becomes drawing.  
My encounter with Kandinsky’s Dance Curves is shaped by my attending to a particular poetics of 
attention. In the pixelated black and white of digital archival material, I feel constantly distracted 
by the movements of the drawings. I think beside these drawings precisely because of their false 
performative, their relation to mediation occluded by the appearance of Palucca’s body. I come 
back to ‘beside’ as an ungrounded mode of relation, but one which continues to take up space 
here. This beside resides in the realm of a spacious agnosticism. To return to Sedgwick: beside 
comprises a range of relations, amongst them ‘desiring, identifying, representing, repelling, 
paralleling, differentiating, rivalling, leaning, twisting, mimicking, withdrawing, attracting’ (2002, 8). 
Beside is as much intuiting a relation between ‘texture and emotion’ (2008, 17) as it is a ‘seeing 
differently’, to borrow from Amelia Jones (2012). Thinking beside the drawings implies a stinted 
attention, a distraction perhaps, towards the periphery, but it also already bound in a literal 
beside—one in which Kandinsky’s drawings are placed next to the Rudolph’s photographs of 
Palucca, suspended in air. In this beside, I see the attraction of a fiction that is nevertheless bound. 
In this encounter with nonconforming criticism, beside makes possible a thinking that is already in 
relation, tethered between my encounter and that staged by Kandinsky.  
I see nonconforming as a frame that brings into productive collision Kandinsky’s Dance Curves, as 
a model, and my encounter with it, as a collusion. On the one hand, Kandinsky’s Dance Curves 
reveals itself to be a thinking in process, engaged in abstractions of photographed movements of 
a body. On the other, my encounter with Dance Curves renders material an experience of a 
performance document, a deliberately mishandled translation that is made to appear. I see its 
fictionality as a complex affective relation to compositional politics, and to modernism’s tension 
with the now. My own tuning to slips of attention between photograph and drawing is a 
dazzlement: a confluence of meanings distracted by temporalities. Interruption is a precondition 
for thinking’s appearance, says Arendt, yet here, I see it in relation to bodies, boundaries, and 
affects—entanglements that already shaped politics of criticism, but that might also configure a 
form of appearance for thinking itself.  
In this way, my focus on the space beside the drawings and photographs searches for the 
peripheries of attention in Dance Curves. In the digital archival material, I slipped in between these 
drawings, drawn to the digital noise of their reproduction ninety-three years later, between the 
resonances of Bauhaus and the politics of abstracted lines, the imposition of bordered spaces and 
the poetics of translating movement. I followed those shifts in attention in being beside the 
drawings. It is on the one hand, that thinking already makes itself known in Kandinsky’s curves and 
Rudolph’s photographs of Palucca’s movements, embroiled in mediation that also makes process 
matter. On the other, it is my slip of attention that makes visible an unfinished thought, an 
interruption that is searching.  
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In coming to a new set of relations, filtered through the thickness of my own troubled encounter, 
I bring the baggage of now to an early modernist study, coming to what Ahmed calls a queer use, 
that is, to an inversion: ‘a temporal discordance between past and present’ which is manifest ‘as a 
discordance between form and function’ because in an institutional sense, use ‘becomes a 
question of fit’ (2018). It is this (my) mis-use, or this problematising of the question of criticism as 
use-full to the work, which I am probing in articulating a relation to distracted thinking. At the same 
time, this reveals the politics of relation that shaped Kandinsky’s own critical use, and its 
enmeshment in Bauhaus’s commitment to abstraction, as well as dialogue with shifting formal and 
gendered concerns of modernist dance.  
As Ahmed proposes, ‘without use, a path can disappear, becoming overgrown, bumpy, unusable’ 
(2018). I understand, in this case, a shift in noticing is then a bump; it quickly disappears, and its 
traces are hard to value in the discursive economies of communicative abundance. Nonconforming 
criticism, as it emerges in my encounter with Dance Curves, and in the work itself, is tethered to this 
mis-use, to a critical engagement that is dissonant, bumpy.  How might my attention shift, stage an 
encounter with a thicker present, a difficult present, without depoliticising the relation with 
Kandinsky, Rudolph, and Palucca? I propose that a different poetics of use is a hopeful dazzlement, 
interruptive and affective.  
In Arendt, I articulated a relation between thinking’s interruption and the entanglement with affect. 
This queering of thinking as in process, as shaping a mis-use beside performance, pays attention 
to affective economies and relations that shape the critical encounter. In this way, I see 
nonconforming criticism as a frame for learning other ways of letting something else through, in 
order to resist not only the already constituted discursive ecologies and thinking’s coercion, but 
also the reproduction of paradigms of mastery that fix performance and criticism, affect and 
matter. A hopeful act, then, is one that searches for the matter of thinking in slips that disturb 
these relations
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